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FINANCE IN WAR 
A lecture delivered by 
Professor Raymond Rodgers 
at the Naval War College 
March 2, 1949 
RESTRICTED 
The subject I am going to talk about today is a great mys­
tery to most people. Yet most people use credit and that is largely 
what I am going to deal with. It is very much as the colored boy 
down south viewed the problem of a mule that he had bought. He 
was bringing this mule home when he ran into a friend of his and 
the friend asked, "How much money did you pay for him?" He 
replied, "O, I didn't pay no money. I got him on credit. I gave my 
note." The other fellow said, "You sure got him cheap." Now 
thatis the problem that we have to keep in mind going through here. 
You can do wonders with credit if you don't overdo it. . You can 
stretch a thing just so far, and with credit you don't know how far 
you can stretch it until it is too late. 
This whole question of financing war, as it is done nowadays, 
is not fully understood. In bygone days it had to be done by inflating 
the currency, and before that by hoarding up treasure or hoarding 
up actual gold 'value of one sort or another. Nowadays we have a 
different system, and in some sense a much better system but, as 
I intimated a moment ago, it is a system that works so wonderfully 
that there is always the danger of saying, "Well, if we did two 
hundred fifty billion, why not do five hundred billion?'' After all, 
that is only another one hundred per cent. We went from fifty to 
two hundred and fifty, that's five hundred per cent so why not go 
'../) 
again and so on, and that's what we have got to watch. 
The actual cost of war cannot be put off, in an economic 
Professor Rodgers is Professor of Banking at New York Univer­
sity. He has written and lectured extensively on financial subjects and 
has held a number of positions in the field of business finance. 
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sense. You cannot postpone it; everyone suffers in time of war. 
. / 
The ships, the planes, the guns, everything that is destroyed has 
to be produced in time of war and it has to come out of the econ­
omy. Civilians have to do without things. These sacrifices cannot be 
postponed. Finance cannot shift the economic burden. It can, how­
ever, shift the burden as between classes of the population, so we 
start out here at the beginning with a very encouraging note for 
you professional gentlemen! 
No modern war has ever been lost_because of finance, that is, 
if you have a modern banking system, and we certainly have one 
in the United States. (Maybe it is a little too modern!) There is no 
excuse for losing a war because of the financial side. (We could go 
ahead and talk about how a modern. war involves mobilization of 
our resources and so on, but I don't think that is necessary for it 
must be an old story to you officers by now.) 
Now the first and simplest way to finance a war is by tax­
ation, and, by all means, it is the best. _Then there is no fooling 
around about it. You have the economic burden and the financial 
burden right at the same time. Prices don't get out of order, 
nothing gets out of line, and the purchasing power of the people 
does not increase. Everybody knows right where he stands. How­
ever, you can't do that in a democracy. You can't even do it in an 
autocracy, and certainly you couldn't do it in America. You have 
to hold a carrot out in front of the mule, as they say in England. 
You have to give the boys a little extra overtime pay. You have 
to give labor a little incentive to produce extraordinarily. Of course, 
patriotism is a great help, but something in the pay envelope also -
comes in handy! So we can't, especially in America, get away with 
financing a war by taxation no matter how sound it may be in 
theory. 
Now let us see why it is so sound in theory. You have no 
increase in the public debt. You don't have any back-log of pur-
26.
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chasing power built up. You don't have the American people hold­
ing two hundred billion dollars of liquid assets and. no place to 
spend it-nothing to bu·y with it. Financing war by taxation would 
mean you wouldn't need the OP A; you wouldn't need price control. 
You wouldn't need such regimentation if you financed by taxation. 
As a matter of fact, gentlemen, if you financed by taxation, 
instead of war creating inflation, it would actually create deflation, 
becaus(;) you would not increase your purchasing power. Every in­
creased dollar would be taken right back by the government. You 
know, the Lord gives and the Lord takes, meaning the sovereign, so 
it will be taken right back. You hand it to the boys and you take 
it away from them Saturday night, or at least at the end of the 
month. But I say, you can't get away with it. The Congress wouldn't 
like it, the. voters wouldn't like it and, no nation, not even Stalin
with his Politburo can get away with financing a war in that 
fashion. 
Now the next best method is to borrow the amount that you 
do not raise by taxation. The question is who to borrow from. Well, 
obviously the best place to borrow is from the real investor, the 
fellow who has real capital, and from the earner by payroll de­
duction-that's the,real McCoy! Take back that purchasing pow­
er-that's the idea. Borrow from the investors, borrow from the 
insurance companies because they get premium income continually. 
They get real capital, the largest source of new real capital in this 
country. Their investment capital each year is the premiums that 
are paid in on the life insurance policies. It runs around three and 
one half to four billion dollars a year, and that means that some­
one has done without something. That means that people have paid 
that purchasing power to an insurance company instead of going 
out and buying the things they could have bought. There is no 
credit expansion there. As I said before, it is the real McCoy. It 
is simply a shifting of purchasing power from the man who has 
27 
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the insurance policy to the insurance company, which in turn 
shifts it to the government through the purchase' of bonds. 
Now, the same thing is true of the payroll deduction plan. 
You gentlemen, who contributed so nobly by having bond deduc­
tions made from your pay, gave real purchasing power to the gov­
ernment. There was no indirection about that. There was no 
hocus-pocus; it was the real thing. If you had not done that, you 
could have gone out and spent the money for something. Don't 
worry, we won't go into the matter of what you might have spent 
it for, but you could have! 
We call that the ultimate investor where you just have a 
transfer of purchasing power and not a creation of new purchasing 
power; the ultimate investor, where people give up part of their 
own purchasing power and turn it over to the government, partly 
as a patriotic gesture and partly because they have coupons on that 
green paper that you get from the government and you get paid a 
little thing called interest ! 
Borrowing from ultimate investors really means from every 
source from which the government gets money, every source to 
which they sell bonds except the commercial banks and the Fed­
eral Reserve banks. Those two groups of institutions have what we 
call "credit expansion power." They can take what you might call 
nothing and make something out of it. They can give you a de­
posit on their books and you can go and buy things with it, and 
that goes for your Uncle Samuel, too. They can credit Uncle Sam 
on the books and Uncle Sam can buy things with it. As a mat­
ter of fact, that is the way the government does it. But please note: 
what I am saying does not go for the savings banks. In theory and in 
practice they are as far removed from the commercial banks as 
possible. It is only the commercial banks and the twelve Federal 
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Reserve Banks which have this expansion power. They can make an 
entry in an account on their books, called a deposit account, and 
then you draw chits on that-that is, pieces of paper called checks. 
And you can pay debts ; you can buy things. You can make the 
wheels go around with that. 
Now you can't do it. If you set up an account and try it, you
go to jail, but the bank has a "system" and you pay interest for the 
use of the system and what ·you pay is very well worth it. Don't 
misunderstand me. TMs is another one of those instances where a 
little knowledge is a dangerous thing. I don't want you to get the 
idea that bankers sit down in a back room and through some hocus­
pocus eventually come up with something that was never seen on 
land or sea and shouldn't have been seen anyway! It is not like 
that at all. There is a system to it. Its creation is something that is 
real and substantial. If it is not done properly, the bubble bursts 
and every man for himself! 
So when you borrow from the ultimate investor it is very 
sound. However, you do put off the day of reckoning in one sense. 
It means that you have to pay the interest through an increase of 
the tax burden. It does effect the budget immediately where tax­
ation didn't. It means that government expenses go up; but it is 
not inflation. 
Our whole problem under this modern system of financing 
war is to prevent inflation. Inflation is the greatest economic and 
social curse known to man and I mean exactly that. It impoverishes 
the wrong people. It puts money in the hands of the wrong people. 
We can say that it is also the greatest curse of war because that 
is when you usually have your inflation-at least the most serious 
inflation, but not always. 
If you finance by selling these bonds to the ultimate in­
vestors, you create a cushion of purchasing power which can be 
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· used at the end of the war and thus help in the reconversion period.
It helps bridge the gap of greatly stimulated production for war
purposes over to the lower peacetime production. We got over it
better this time than we were entitled to. We did not have the eight
million unemployed as the bureaucrats insisted we were going to
have visited upon us. We did right well, thanks again to the miracle
of American industry.
I don't get paid a dime by the Association of Manufacturers 
for telling you that either. Another thing, I don't want you to mis­
understand my politics. I am not sent here by the Republican Na­
tional Committee. I was born in Kentucky, a Democrat, and they 
don't come any worse than that! 
In this country we didn't sell as many bonds to the ultimate 
investors as they did in Canada or as they did in Great Britain. 
We can't be too proud of ourselves about it. On the other hand, we 
did get away with it and we did win the war,�so let's not lament
too much about what they did in Canada and what they did in 
Britain. 
We now come to the sixty-four dollar question-borrow­
ing from the commercial banks. Here is where you are liable to 
be hit twice by that terrible two-edged sword of economics. In 
economics practically anything is liable to hit you going and coming, 
and it's bad when you get that. So, let's watch this very carefully. 
As a matter of fact, it wouldn't be necessary for me to come up 
here today if it was not to elucidate this point, and it is a point 
that isn't understood even by some barikers. They have a system, 
as I told you before, and· it is chiefly that system which I want 
to talk about to you today. 
When the government borrows from the banks it causes an 
increase in bank deposits and this is the way it is done. I want, 
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the banker sends that in to the Federal to his fifteen per cent re­
serve. Then he can buy five or six dollars worth of government 
bonds or make loans to an equivalent amount., 
We are going through it again now, using bonds. The way 
the banks buy bonds is by means of using an account that was 
started in World War I. The title of the account is "War Loan Ac­
count, Treasurer of the U. S." That was set up at the beginning of 
World War I, and has been going ever since, and if one of your 
shades should come back to referee a World War two hundred 
generations hence, you would probably find the same account right 
on the books ! 
Here is what happens. One day the banker gets a letter from 
the Fiscal Agent for the government saying, "The Treasury is of­
fering, as of such and such a date, fifteen billion dollars of which 
so many billion dollars will be eligible for bank purchase. We in­
vite you to subscribe up to a maximum of ----." They will 
give as a maximum a certain percentage of capital and surplus. 
Why do they put a maximum? Because 'the banks want more. So 
would you if you could write on both sides of an account and get 
one or two per cent! You wouldn't mind. You would want more. So 
they notify the Federal. And in due· time the banks are notified 
that as of a certain day they can make the entry, and as of that day 
what does each bank do? They make this entry I am talking to you 
about. Suppose a bank was told that they could have one hundred 
thousand dollars worth of· "Governments". As of the authorized 
day, they debit government investments, and credit "War Loan Ac­
count, Treasurer of the U. S."-$100,000. 
Now the government does not draw checks on commercial 
banks. The government used to do that fifty or sixty years ago, 
but charges of politics were made and presidents had trouble and 
things of that sort, so the government plays it safe now. As you 
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gentlemen know, they draw checks only on the Treasury but they 
are payable at the Federal so the government, by telegram, trans­
fers this balance in War Loan Account to the Federal, pays it 
out and it comes back to the commercial bank-but all of that has 
nothing to do with what I am explaining this morning. That's 
merely because of the auditing practices of the government. 
Eventually, the plane manufacturer or the munition manu­
facturer gets a check from the government on the government's 
account at the Federal. What does that munitions manufacturer 
do? He doesn't have an account at the Federal, but he does have 
an account at the State Street Trust Company or the Chase Na­
tional Bank, or some other good bank so he takes that check in 
to them. His account is credited, so the government's account­
the War Loan Account which went to the Federal-is debited 
and ends up in the account of the manufacturer at the commercial 
bank. In other words, all we have there is a transfer via the Fed­
eral, from the account of Uncle Sam to the account of "John Q. 
Public." That's the way it happens. They keep repeating that 
process over and over. 
Here is the thing to keep your eye on; watch the ball now! 
Each time the· government sells a billion dollars worth of bonds 
· to the banks in this way, it results first in an increase in War Loan
Account of a billion dollars and then,as the government sends the
money over to the Federal and it comes back, it results in an in­
crease of a billion dollars in the deposit accounts of the American
people--money which they can spend and buy things-ordinary
deposit accounts. It is just as good as if they had taken actual
money down and left it with the teller. It is just as good as if they
had borrowed it themselves. The only difference is that the gov-
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Now here is the ball I told you to watch-that expansion 
of deposits can then be used by the public, over, and over again, to 
buy more government bonds or to buy whoopee or anything the 
public wants to buy with it. It is their money. It has been trans­
ferred from the government's account to "John Q. Public". 
In sharp contrast, when a member of the public buys a gov­
ernment bond, all you have is a shift from one deposit account to 
another. He draws a check on his own account (That's the way 
you pay for it) and what does the government do with that check? 
The bank debits the deposit account of the bond purchaser so that 
his deposit goes down, and they credit the deposit account of Uncle 
Sam. This does not go into the War Loan Account. This is not 
credit expansion. This is a transfer of purchasing power. It is 
no increase-only a transfer and thus not inflationary. 
During the war our commercial banks reached a total in­
vestment of some eighty-eight billion dollars worth of government 
bonds. Thus the government borrowed more than �ighty billion 
dollars from the banks through this process which I have just 
described. Let us see what that means. It means that each time 
they borrowed, the total of deposit accounts, first, of the govern­
ment went up, and then later, of the American people. In plain 
English it means, at the moment, that the American people have 
sixty-three billion dollars of deposit accounts that they would not 
have had if the government had not sold sixty-three billion of 
bonds to the banks and if they had not held them. We thus have 
that purchasing power which would not have been in existence. 
You may ask how long it will be there.? The answer is: It will be
.·there as long as the bonds are on the asset side of the balance 
sheet! So long as the banks have sixty-three billion dollars worth 
of government bonds, they have to have sixty-three billion dollars 
worth of bank deposits. It may not be in the same bank; it may 
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move from bank to bank, but it has got to be in the system. It can't 
.. exist any place else. As you know, if you have the debit, you have 
to have the credit. 
It is very difficult for many to see the impact of this-to 
see its importance. Since the government began to borrow from the 
banks in 1934 there have been many wrong guesses as to how much 
can be borrowed in this way. I don't know what the upper limit is, 
as it is a case where "you furnish your music as you go along." 
Every time the deposits in the banks went up a billion dollars, a 
billion dollars was put in the hands of the people with which they 
could be patriotic and they, in the next bond drive, could give 
up a billion dollars in checks to the government. Their accounts 
would go down a billion and the government's account would go up a 
billion, and then what would the government do? It would spend a 
billion to pay for military services or supplies or whatever they 
spend the money for, and the deposit would then move out of the 
government account, back into the individual's account, over and 
· over again, until the end of time, or until those bonds come off the
asset side of the balance sheets of the banks. Gentlemen, don't
try to make something mysterious out of this or something dif­
ficult. It is the simplest thing in the world.
With all of this borrowing by the government and by busi­
ness, why are interest rates so low? Prices are higher than they 
were before the war; also there is more business activity than 
ever before. There is more demand for credit. Why then is money 
so very easy? The answer is simple: We have sixty three billion 
dollars of credit-sixty three billion dollars of purchasing power 
in the banks because of the method of financing the war through the 
banks. It is not folding money but it will do until the folding money 
comes along. It is sixty-three billion of purchasing power that is 
being used, over and over again, . week after week. This is the 
main answer as to why interest rates are so low. 
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There is one more thing I want to call to your attention. 
In America, we can borrow our reserves. Of course that is subject to 
the limitation of the total of gold. We have to have a certain 
amount of gold back of those reserve balances. But we have had, 
since World War I, which made us the unwilling recipient of the 
gold of the world, too much gold in this country. We have had no 
problem on gold back of our reserves. A lot of people, particularly 
professors, have been trying to make a problem of this, . but we 
really had no problem on it. We �an get the gold we want, any time 
we want, as long as we have the military power, the economic 
power, the industrial might. We can get gold; that is no problem 
at all. If, however, in time of war, our gold reserve (which was 
legally 25% during this war) falls below or shows that it is go., 
ing to fall below, all we need to do is reduce the reserve require­
ment and we will get away with it. We used to have thirty-five 
per cent of gold back of those deposits. We cut it to twenty-five 
per cent but nobody worried about it. 
During the war, the Federal held twenty-three billion dol­
lars worth of government bonds. How did the Federal get those 
bonds? They bought them by crediting the account of the govern­
ment. Thus to make it easier for the commercial banks to buy gov­
ernment bonds, the Federal Reserve Banks created twenty-three 
billion dollars of reserve, right on the barrel head. All during the 
war there was never any shortage of reserves. No bank had to send 
over any consequential amount of its government bonds to borrow to·
create its reserves; the government beat them to it. The Federal 
Reserve bought bonds and created the reserve account. On the 
basis of their reserve accounts the banks can create deposits. The 
member banks can then buy bonds and credit the government in the 
special deposit account called "War Loan Account", as explained 
before, and from there the purchasing power is transferred to the 
deposit accounts of the American people. 
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That is modern banking; that is the one thing that our com­
mercial· banking system does that no other part of our economic 
system can do. It is a remarkable service that they perform for us. 
It is really a wonderful thing. However, to make the system work we 
have to have public confidence and I am sure I do not have to tell 
you boys where yqu fit in that picture. As long as the public has
confidence in that system, there seems to be no limit to it. After 
the war we ran the debt up to 276 billion dollars. Unfortunately, 
it now appears.that there are some "boys" in Washington who think 
there is no limit. Now there is a limit even though we don't know 
exactly where it is. 
I want to conclude by saying that the role of finance has de­
clined in importance under modern warfare. To say this is probably 
unwise. As you know the customary thing to do is to tell you that 
finance is the most important thing in the world, and to listen very 
carefully or you are going to miss the boat and all that sort of thing. 
Well, that is a lot of nonsense. As I told you at the very beginning, 
you boys don't have to worry about it too much. I don't mean that 
you should go hay-wire or anything like that, but I do mean that 
with our modern banking system, the problem of financing war 
is greatly simplified. This was especially true during World War II. 
During the past war we did a much better job than -we did in 
· World War I.
The banks in this war did a good deal of financing for one­
third of one per cent per annum on Treasury bills. Now ponder 
that. If anyone tells you that the banks profiteered, remember, as 
bookkeeper.s they have to get something, and one-third of one per 
cent isn't much. They are entitled to something for working out 
such a system. They got eighty seven and one half pundredths of 
one per cent on Certificates of Indebtedness. In addition, the banks 
were able also, to buy long term bonds, on which they got less 
than two per cent, after taxes. All in all, they did a magnificent job. 
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So, in conclusion, I want to say that we financed this war 
very nicely, very neatly. There are lots of things that were done in 
Washington that I could criticize, but everything considered, the 
boys did a grand job. 
During the war, and since, they have done.a magnificent 
job of managing the public debt. We have a public debt now, as 
you know, of a quarter of a trillion dollars, and some people say 
the problem i.s whether we are going to pay it off, manage it, or 
repudiate it, or what not. Certainly we are not going to repudiate 
it, and in my humble opinion and within this room, there is no real 
need for us to pay it off. We will, of course, pay off some of it, but, 
as a matter of fact, I don't think the American people want it paid 
off. We are going to manage it, because if we don't manage it, 
gentlemen, it will manage us. The way the Federal Reserve author­
ities and the Treasury have fought inflation with one hand by 
raising the reserve requirements, raising interest rates, and with 
the other hand bought government securities and kept up the price 
· of government bonds until they finally passed the crucial test has
really been magnificent. When you can push up with one hand and
push down with the other and get away with it, you are pretty
darn good. As I said, they did that and I believe in giving credit
where credit is due. I had no hand in it; moreover I have never
gotten a dime from the Treasury or the monetary authorities for
defending them. I did get $15.60 a month in World War I from the
government as an enlisted man in the Navy. I earned it; the officers
saw to that. My conscience doesn't bother me one bit. So I want
to make it clear that I don't come here as an apologist for anything
that I had anything to do with and I don't come here to whitewash
anybody.
Clearly, the way we financed this war is the way we will 
finance the next one. I do hope we will finance more of the next 
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one by means of taxation although the. taxes were high enough in 
this one for me. When a college professor has to pay fifty cents out 
of an income dollar as income taxes, taxes are certainly high. None.,. 
theless, we do have to recognize that taxation right up to the 
breaking point, but not beyond it, is the soundest way to finance 
war; Any additional amounts needed can be supplied through 
credit expansion by our marvelous banking system. 
That concludes my story, and thank you very much for 
your close attention. 
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